Toby
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I think I've posted some of Carlton Vogt's stuff in this thread previously, but as a seque from guns to a related concept, here's his latest column...
quote:
NATIONAL ID CARDS STILL A BAD IDEA
Posted Jan 15, 2002 10:08 Pacific Time
When I first raised the issue of national ID cards in the wake of Sept. 11 (see here), I laid out some practical concerns with the idea. Despite the fact that many people agree, the notion still hasn't gone away and continues to surface from time to time.
Most people who responded to my column agreed that it was a bad idea, but many others, as could be expected from a technical audience, wrote in to tell me technological solutions could get around any problems we might encounter.
I can't disagree that this might be the case. We can probably build a technological solution for just about anything. But if failure analysis has taught us anything, it's that the more complex any system is, the more likely it is to fail. When it passes a certain point of complexity, failure becomes not probable, but inevitable. The question is not whether it will fail, but when and how.
Technological feasibility, however, is a red herring. Even if we could construct a technologically reliable system, the question remains whether it's something we ought to do in the first place.
The main objection to a national ID card system is that, although it is intended to protect one very important interest we have -- national and personal security -- it invades or compromises another interest that is just as important -- privacy. This sort of trade-off isn't unusual. We often find ourselves subordinating one important interest to another. And when we do, we often use a set of criteria, whether or not we articulate it in a systematic way, to decide whether the trade-off between competing interests is warranted and worthwhile.
One method that I find useful considers various factors including efficacy, reasonableness, and a balance of benefit and burdens. This has been developed by ethicists for other situations, and I've adapted it to this one.
First, we would need to determine whether the situation was serious enough to warrant even considering an invasion of an important interest. After all, to set back one interest, the threat to another interest would have to be credible, serious, and significant. To compromise something as important as liberty or privacy should not be something that's undertaken frivolously or for a threat that's not likely to happen.
Next, we should be sure that what we're proposing has a reasonable chance of success. If it doesn't, then we stand the chance of setting back two interests instead of one -- the original threat would still exist and we'd have lost something else significant in the process. Here we need to determine what the likely outcome is, not just the desired outcome. If we look solely to the desired outcome, we end up in the same position as those poor souls who invest their entire life savings in tickets for the big lottery prize. They may want to win the $100 million, but the likely outcome is that they'll be disappointed.
Another critical criterion is that the infringement should be the least amount necessary to bring about the desired result. Otherwise, we embark on an unnecessarily heavy-handed solution that in the case of basic and important interests can be dangerous overkill.
Finally, we have to see some proportionality between the burden caused by infringing one interest and the expected benefit to the other. Again, it's important to consider the likely outcome, not simply the desired one. It would be a serious mistake either to overstate the probable outcome or to understate the probable burden.
So let's apply this schema to the case of national ID cards. We can stipulate that the situation is serious. There is a terrorist threat. We know terrorist cells are operating in the country. And all indications are that they will try again -- although not necessarily on as horrific a scale as Sept. 11. So, we pass the first hurdle.
Where the idea begins to stumble is on the question of probable success. Anyone defending a national ID system would need to show that this system would prevent future attacks. I'm not sure we can be that certain. The ID system might make life a little more difficult for potential terrorists, but it doesn't seem to be more than a stumbling block that can be overcome -- especially for dedicated people with significant resources.
In the past, terrorists have taken advantage of an immigration system that didn't do a very good job of keeping track of such things as expired visas and students not enrolling in classes for which they had received permission to enter the country. A national ID system could put an end to that, but as long as we freely allow people into the country for many different reasons, potential terrorists would simply make sure that their "papers" were in order. They became lazy and sloppy about their immigration status because we had become lazy and sloppy. If we become more stringent, I think it's safe to assume they'll be more careful. These are dedicated and tenacious people.
There's no question that a national ID system represents a serious compromise of our liberty and privacy. Many people who responded to my original column on the subject argued that we already have some type of ID in driver's licenses or passports. The quick answer to that is, while it's true, those who accept these forms of ID do so willingly, and, more important, not having one (unless of course you're driving) isn't a crime and doesn't constitute probable cause.
Under a national ID system, a police officer could ask you for your ID at any time and if you were unable to produce one, you automatically would be suspected of a crime and could conceivably be taken into custody on the basis of that alone. So we need to ask whether such a system is the least infringement of our interests necessary to bring about the result.
Key to answering that question is exactly what we're trying to do. Is it necessary that we track 95-year-old Aunt Tillie as she moves from the senior center to her apartment and to church on Sunday? Or are we trying to tighten up our borders and intercept possible terrorists at critical points, such as airports? If it's the latter, then perhaps we ought to design a system that does that without placing a burden on the millions of people who neither fly frequently nor cross international borders with any regularity.
That brings us to the final criterion in our schema -- whether the burden of such a system would be justified by the probable benefit. A national ID system not only takes away some essential rights we have to privacy and liberty, it would create yet another layer of government bureaucracy -- with all that this entails.
But the dangers for the individual go beyond this. We will come to rely increasingly on these cards for all sorts of identification -- from the convenience store to the bank -- in addition to its intended use. Those without an ID -- in addition to being a suspect -- will also become a nonperson, at least until they get a replacement. This leaves the way open for unscrupulous police officers or rogue judges to render someone invisible merely by confiscating, however temporarily, their ID.
The system also would create a giant centralized database, and you don't need to be a security expert to know that this represents a big, fat target for anyone who wants to indulge in serious mischief -- including terrorists. Under the guise of increasing security, we would simply create another area where we were vulnerable -- an example of self-defeating behavior.
So, comparing the probable benefits, which are slight at best and uncertain at worst, against the burdens, which on one hand are serious and on the other are dangerous, such an ID system just doesn't measure up. It was a bad idea before -- and it's still a bad idea.
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01-18-2002 06:03 PM
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